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Abstract 
  
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of Islamic banks (IBs) 
product and services disclosure (PSD). 
 
Design/methodology/approach: A computer-based content analysis is run upon the annual 
reports for a sample of 78 IBs operating in 11 countries from 2004 to 2012 to find the number 
of product and services statements. The levels and trends of PSD are identified. A regression 
analysis to identify the factors affecting PSD in IBs is also used.  
 
Findings: The findings suggest that there has been a significant improvement of PSD over 
time. The results show a positive association between PSD and Shariah board size, board size, 
chief executive officer (CEO) tenure, duality in position, blockholders and investment 
account holders. However, they show a negative association between PSD and institutional 
ownership. In addition, it appears that board independence does not affect significantly banks’ 
PSD. It is also found that the bank performance, bank age, leverage, listing, adoption of 
international financial reporting standards, adoption of Accounting and Auditing 
Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions and country transparency index have a positive 
effect on the PSD. 
 
Originality/value: This study offers an original contribution to corporate disclosure literature 
by being the first to develop and investigate PSD for a large sample of IBs during a long 
period of time. It links P&S with bank corporate governance characteristics. The findings 
have many important policy implications. More specifically, this paper encourages regulators 
in the studied countries to improve corporate governance mechanisms in their Islamic banking 
systems through the optimization of ownership structure, CEO’s characteristics and the 
board’s characteristics, to promote PSD. Moreover, the findings support the theoretical 
predictions of the generalized agency theory. This study’s empirical evidence enhances the 
understanding of the corporate social responsibility disclosure environment in general and the 
PSD environment in particular for IBs. This study is the first one that measures PSD in the 
annual reports for a large cross-countries sample of IBs during a long period of time. It is also 
the first one that links PSD with IBs corporate governance mechanisms.  
 
Keywords: Governance, Content analysis, Islamic Banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The adoption of BASEL II directives for the banking sector and especially the Pillar III “The 
market discipline”1 highlights the importance of disclosure, especially products and services 
(P&S) disclosure. The adoption of BASEL II directives for the banking sector and especially the 
Pillar III “The market discipline”1 highlights the importance of disclosure, especially Products and 
Services (P&S) disclosure. The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI) has issued governance standard No. 7: Corporate Social Responsibility, 
Conduct and Disclosure for IFIs. In this standard, corporate social responsibility (CSR) in IFIs 
refers to all activities carried out by an IFI to meet its religious and ethical responsibility to their 
stakeholders. Islamic Banks (IBs) should follow Shariah to gain trust of the stakeholders. IBs offer 
distinct financial P&S and as such have grown significantly over the past two decades. They are 
accountable to fulfil a social and ethical role inherent in their character as an IFI. In addition, they 
have a duty to show their accountability through disclosing CSR information, consistent with the 
principals of Islam. Disclosure about Islamic P&S is a dimension of ethical CSR disclosure. In 
particular, an IB should specifically disclose key points concerning its P&S. Disclosure about 
Islamic P&S could be considered as ethical identity disclosure.  
 
The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of corporate governance on P&S disclosure 
for Islamic banks. We contribute to existing literature by investigating relatively unexplored 
research issue that measure levels of P&S disclosure and its determinants for IBs. We are also the 
first to provide a cross-country evidence on the impact of corporate governance on P&S disclosure 
for a large sample of IBs.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops the research 
hypotheses. Section 3 presents the methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical findings. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
Disclose information regarding Islamic P&S may attract investors who are conscious about the 
authenticity and ethical value of the activity of the bank. It also promotes the development of the 
Islamic banking industry by supporting its competitive advantages versus the conventional 
counterpart (Farag et al., 2014; El-Halaby and Hussainey, 2015). Whilst the trend is towards 
mandatory Islamic reporting standards, AAOIFI standards are mandatory in some countries and 
voluntary in others. In fact, these standards tried to improve disclosure regulatory framework for 
the Islamic banking industry. In the following paragraphs, we review relevant theories, empirical 
literature on governance and disclosure to develop our research hypotheses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1  The aim of Pillar III is to allow market discipline to operate by requiring institutions to disclose details on the scope 
of application, capital, risk exposures, risk assessment processes. 
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2.1 Ownership structure  
 
2.1.1 Blockholders ownership  
 
Zouari and Taktak (2014) argue that concentrated ownership is a common feature in IBs. More 
than 70 per cent equity is dominated by the top five shareholders. In line with the agency theory, 
most of studies in emerging markets provide evidence that there was a negative association 
between ownership concentration and the level of voluntary disclosure (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; 
Htay, 2012). Grassa and Chakroun (2016) find that corporate governance disclosure negatively 
associated with the number of blockholders in GCC banks. In addition, Htay et al. (2012) find that 
lower block ownership in Malaysian listed banks has higher social and environmental information 
disclosure.  
 
However according to the stakeholder-agency theory, the agency conflicts are mitigated when IBs 
managers’ decisions concerning voluntary disclosure are aligned with all the stakeholders’ 
interests. Consequently, the existence of higher percentages of blockholders in IBs tends to 
encourage the managers to disclose P&S information requested by the stakeholders of IBs. 
Besides, IBs owned by large blockholders tend to disclose more P&S information than other IBs. 
In fact, blockholders differently to minor shareholders fully benefit of being associated to a bank 
with large P&S disclosure. Consequently, blockholders would incite managers to adopt policies 
that improve bank’s P&S disclosure. Hence, we set our first hypothesis as follows:  
 
H1. There is a positive association between the percentages of blockholders’ owners and levels of 
P&S disclosure.  
 
2.1.1 Institutional Ownership  
 
In emergent markets, institutional investors play a crucial role in monitoring management and 
improving P&S disclosure which help firms to meet its fiduciary responsibilities and to improve 
performance. Zouari and Taktak (2014) suggest that the ultimate owner in IBs is institutional. 
Therefore, IBs with large institutional ownership have to disclose more P&S in order to satisfy 
institutional investors’ particular needs. Thus, Xiao et al.’s (2004) provide evidence of the 
existence of a positive relationship between institutional ownership and corporate disclosure. In 
addition, Grassa and Chakroun (2016) suggest that the institutional ownership is related positively 
but insignificantly to corporate governance disclosure of GCC banks.  
 
Besides, in line with the stakeholder-agency theory of (Hill and Jones, 1992) we could predicted 
that high concentration of institutional ownership might ensure the financial market that the IB 
seeks to protect stakeholders’ interests by increasing the level of P&S disclosure in their annual 
reports. In relation to the stakeholder-agency theory and to the findings of previous work, we 
assume the existence of a positive relationship between institutional ownership and P&S reporting. 
Hence, our second hypothesis is as follows:  
 
H2. There is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and levels of P&S disclosure.  
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2.1.3 Investment account holders (IAH)  
 
IAH are a special category of investors that are not represented on the board and without granted 
control nor monitoring rights (Safieddine, 2009). Magalhaes and Al-Saad (2013) focus on the 
relationship between corporate governance practice and the safeguarding of the IAH as major 
stakeholders in IBs. They find that the current practices implemented by IBs in protecting the rights 
of IAH are not effective enough in the light of standard corporate governance practices. IBs face 
a number of agency problems. The contractual structure of these banks may affect the P&S 
disclosure in their annual reports. The specificity of agency problems is the existence of two types 
of principals (IAH and shareholders). There is asymmetric information between these principals 
and management particularly about P&S. Farook et al. (2011, p 366) state “the IAH, if it is 
comprised of Islamic investors would also be interested in the level of compliance of the bank with 
Islamic laws and principals”.  
 
IAH do not have voting rights and are expected to be more interested in the P&S disclosure, 
especially if it is comprised of Islamic investors, than the shareholders. In fact, this specific type 
of disclosure is an aspect of the banks compliance with Islamic principles. Islamic investors are 
expected to be interested in the P&S that IBs offers rather than share ownership of these banks. 
Farook et al. (2011) find a positive relationship between IAH and CSR disclosure. Rahman and 
Saimi (2015) find that the IAH affects positively and significantly the ethical identity disclosure 
level in the Islamic banking industry in Malaysia and Bahrain. Hence, we set our third hypothesis 
as follows:  
 
H3. There is a positive relationship between IAH and levels of P&S disclosure.  
 
2.2 Board characteristics  
 
2.2.1 Board size  
 
Board size is an important indicator of a bank’s need to link itself with the external environment. 
According to resource dependency theory, larger number of directors who have diverse skills and 
expertise could help to enhance the level of corporate disclosure (Parsa et al., 2007). Consequently, 
when boards of IBs are large, there is expertise diversity and it is more likely that they include 
directors who tend to favour the increase of P&S disclosure in the annual reports.  
 
Many previous studies on voluntary disclosure suggest that firms, with large board size, are more 
likely to disclose voluntarily in their annual reports when compared to firms with small boards 
(Htay, 2012). Grassa and Chakroun (2016) find a positive relationship between board size and the 
level of corporate governance disclosure in GCC banks. Chen and Jaggi (2000) argue that larger 
size of board may decrease the possibility on information asymmetry. Rahman and Saimi (2015) 
find that the board size influences positively and significantly the ethical identity disclosure level 
in IBs in Malaysia and Bahrain.   
 
Based on the resource dependency theory and to the arguments of previous work, we expect that 
larger board may encourage the disclosure of the IBs’ P&S and we set our fourth hypothesis as 
follows:  
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H4. There is a positive relationship between board size and levels of P&S disclosure.  
 
2.2.2 Shariah board size  
 
IBs have to respect Shariah in all their activities. Therefore, they must have a Shariah board (SB). 
SB discloses Shariah report which shows the compliance of the transactions of IB with Islamic 
laws and principles. This board is a specific corporate governance body in Islamic finance that 
plays an essential role in the governance of IBs (Garas and Pierce, 2010). Furthermore, this board 
is the guarantor of the respect of Shariah principles and has to report on compliance of the bank 
with Shariah. Garas and Pierce (2010) argue that the SB is found to control the IFIs advisors more 
than the other types of Sharia supervision such as Shariah consulting firms or Shariah advisors.  
 
Consistent with previous studies, large SB might influence positively the quality of disclosure of 
IBs. Farag et al. (2014) argue that SB has social influence and authority in monitoring the IBs 
compliance with Shariah principals such as “full disclosure”. This finding implies the essential 
role of SB to support IB’s ethical activities. Rahman and Saimi (2015) find that the size of SB 
influences positively the ethical identity disclosure level in IBs. Rahman and Bukair (2013) find 
that the combination of SB attributes has a positive influence on CSR disclosure.  
 
The SB size is likely to ensure that IBs operations are in compliance with Shariah rules and 
principals (accountability, full disclosure…). Consequently larger SB would provide more 
effective monitoring and more consistency with Shariah. More members in SB tend to increase 
the collective knowledge and experience of it that could be a factor to the increase of P&S 
disclosure. Otherwise, stakeholders of IBs request a high level of P&S information and a high 
number of directors in this board should ensure the stakeholders about the Shariah compliance of 
the bank transactions. Based on the stakeholder-agency theory and to the arguments of previous 
works, especially the expertise diversity of large SB, we expect that larger SB leads to more 
compliance with Shariah principles, which leads to higher disclosure level of P&S. Hence, we set 
our fourth hypothesis as follows: 
 
H5. There is a positive relationship between Shariah board size and levels of P&S disclosure.  
 
2.2.3 Board independence  
 
According to the stakeholders-agency theory, board independence leads to a better control of 
management and, therefore, to a high quality of disclosure. Independent directors tend to reduce 
interest conflicts between directors and stakeholders thanks to their independence and objectivity. 
Previous studies argue a positive association between board independence and the level of 
voluntary disclosure. Grassa and Chakroun (2016) find, for GCC banks, a positive relationship 
between board independence and the level of corporate governance disclosure. Khan (2010) shows 
that non-executive directors have a positive impact on CSR reporting in Bangladesh. Moreover, 
Htay et al. (2012) reports that higher percentage of independent directors in Malaysian listed banks 
have higher social and environmental information disclosure.  
 
On the basis of the arguments of the stakeholders-agency theory and of the previous work, we set 
our sixth hypothesis as follows: 
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H6. There is a positive relationship between board independence and levels of P&S disclosure.  
 
2.3 CEO characteristics  
 
2.3.1 CEO duality  
 
In accordance to the assumption of the convergence of interests of the dominant personality with 
those of the other shareholders, duality in position could lead to increase the level of voluntary 
disclosure in the bank (Morck et al., 1988). Also, the stakeholder-agency theory is in favour of the 
fact that the leadership position enables the CEO to be more aware of the informational interests 
of all stakeholders (Hill and Jones, 1992). In this sense, the IBs’ CEO tends to increase the level 
of ethical disclosure about Islamic P&S in the annual reports. In fact this type of voluntary 
disclosure is considered as of major interest for stakeholders. The studies of Barako (2007) and 
Grassa and Chakroun (2016), conducted in emergent markets, argue that the CEO duality leads to 
improve the level of voluntary disclosure. Then, we could expect that the existence of CEO 
dualitywithin the IBs tends to reduce the information asymmetry and helps the level of P&S 
disclosure to rise.  
 
On the basis of the stakeholder-agency theory and on the assumption of the convergence of 
interests and on the arguments of previous work, we set our seventh hypothesis as follows: 
 
H7. There is a positive association between CEO duality and levels of P&S disclosure.  
 
2.3.2 CEO tenure  
 
A long CEO tenure may reduce uncertainty and lack of useful information for the director. The 
increasing period of directors sitting on the board, helped to increase their knowledge about the IB 
activity which, in turn, could improve the quality of disclosed information in the annual reports. 
In this case, the level of P&S disclosure is likely to increase with the increasing of the period of 
CEO tenure.  
 
Conversely, a long CEO tenure may cause the entrenchment effects. Thereafter long CEO tenure 
discourages the IBs to disclose CSR information related to their P&S. Therefore, IBs with long 
CEO tenure have to disclose a low level of P&S information in their annual reports. In addition, 
CEOs sitting in the IBs for a long period tend to decrease the level of Islamic P&S information 
disclosed in the annual reports in order to withhold information to the stakeholders of the banks. 
We could suggest that in IBs, there is a negative association between CEO tenure and voluntary 
P&S disclosure. Consistent with previous studies, CEO tenure might influence negatively the P&S 
disclosure of IBs. Hence, we set our eighth hypothesis as follows: 
 
H8. There is a negative association between CEO tenure and levels of P&S disclosure.  
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3. Research Methodology 
3.1 The Sample  
We use the central banks around the world to identify the Islamic banks with 100% Shariah 
compliant assets for the period 2004-2012. We collect data from different sources as shows in 
Table I. We find 160 IBs that match our initial sample selection criteria. For the sake of consistency 
in our sample, we excluded IBs in both Iran (18 IBs) and Turkey (4 IBs) as they do not have the 
SB. We also excluded IBs which provide only financial statements (37 banks). In addition, we 
excluded subsidiaries from our sample (11 IBs). Therefore, we collect data for 78 IBs from 11 countries 
namely: Bahrain, Brunei, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria 
and UAE.  
We create a list of keywords related to the Islamic P&S that IBs offer to their clients to examine the 
level of P&S disclosure. We read relevant literature and a sample of annual reports of Islamic banks to 
create this list (appendix AI). Following Hussainey et al, (2003) we use a computer software package 
(NUDIST version 6) to measure the number of sentences that include at least one of the P&S keywords. 
Using a software package helped us to automatically score a large numbers of annual report narratives 
at very low marginal costs. We use the number of P&S related sentences as our measure for the 
disclosure of Islamic banks. Following Hussainey et al, (2003) we read a sample of Islamic Banks’ 
annual report and count the number of R&S sentences. We then test the correlation between these 
manual scores and the score we calculated using NUDIST version 6. We find that the correlation 
between the manual score and the computerised score are 90%. This indicates that our measure of 
disclosure is reliable. Our independent and control variables are shows in Table I. 
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Table I: Model specification and variable measurement 
Abbreviated 
name 
Full name Variable description Data source 
PSD P&S disclosure Score of P&S disclosure Annual report 
    
BLOCK Number of blockholders 
 
The number of blockholders– shareholders whose 
ownership ≥5 % of total number of shares issued 
Zawya data base- bank 
website-annual report 
INSTIT Institutional ownership Percent of shares owned by institutional shareholders Zawya data base- bank 
website-annual report 
DUAL Duality in position Dummy variable: 1 if IB's CEO serves as a board 
chairman, 0 otherwise 
Annual report 
TENURE CEO tenure The number of years occupying the position of CEO Annual report 
BDSIZE Board size The number of board members Annual report 
BDIND Board independence Ratio of the number of non-executive directors to the total 
number of the directors 
Annual report 
SBSIZE Shariah board size The number of Shariah board members Annual report 
IAH Investment account holders Total Profit-Sharing Investment Account / total assets Annual report 
Control 
variables 
  
 
The average annual change in ROA over 2004–2012 
 
 
Annual report: 
Financial statements 
FP Financial performance 
LEVERAGE Leverage Long-term debt / total assets Annual report: 
Financial statements 
BANKSIZE Bank size Natural logarithm of total assets Annual report: 
Financial statements 
BKAGE Bank age IB age Bank website 
IFS Islamic finance share The share of Islamic banking assets to total banking 
assets in the concerned country  
Grassa and Gazdar 
(2014) 
LIST Listed bank Dummy variable: 1 if the IBs is listed in the stock 
exchange, 0 otherwise 
Stock exchange 
COUTRANSDEX Business extent of disclosure index The index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values 
indicating more disclosure 
World Bank 
 
AAOIFI AAOIFI Dummy variable: 1 if the IBs use AAOIFI standards, 0 
otherwise 
Annual report: 
Financial statements 
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3.2 The model 
To empirically investigate the effect of corporate governance on P&S disclosure, we use the 
following regression as in Eq. (1):  
PSDit = αi + β1 BLOCKit + β2 INSTITit + β 3 SBSIZEit + β 4 DUALit + β 5 TENUREit + 
β 6 BDSIZEit + β7 BDINDit + β8 IAHit+ β9 FPit + β10 LEVERAGEit+ β11 BANKSIZEit 
+ β12 BKAGEit + β13 IFSit + β14 COUTRANSDEXit + β15 AAOIFIit +   ∑ 𝛽16 
𝑛
𝑐=1 Di++ 
β17 LISTit +εi 
Σ𝐷𝑖𝑛𝐶=1 : are country dummy variables take the value of 1 for the respective country and zero 
otherwise. εi: is the white noise error term. All other variables are defined in Table I.  
To explore the interrelationship between product and service disclosure (PSD) and financial 
performance (FP), we formulate the following system of simultaneous equations that address 
the potential endogeneity issues in the estimation.  
PSD = f1 (FP, Z1, ε1)                              (2a) 
FP = f1 (PSD, Z2, ε2)                              (2b) 
where Zi are the vector of control variables and instruments influencing the dependent variables; 
and εi are the white noise error terms associated with the unobservable effects resulting from 
firm heterogeneity i.e. unobservable features of managerial behaviour that explain 
heterogeneity in PSD and FP. 
We redefine bank visibility as a instrumental variable. It is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the bank is listed in the stock market of the respective country and 0 otherwise. 
We assume that IBs listed in stock markets are more visible to investors and media and are 
likely to adopt consistent policies with stakeholders such as engaging in P&S disclosure. Hence, 
we expect that our instrumental variable is likely to be correlated with P&S disclosure and not 
with financial performance. We believe also that the selected instrumental variable satisfies the 
necessary conditions for valid instruments assuming that the disturbance is not auto-correlated2 
(Kennedy, 2003).  
 
                                                          
2 We test for the serial correlation in residuals using both the Breusch–Godfrey–Lagrange Multiplier and Durbin–
Watson tests. The results of the two tests show that the residuals are not serially correlated. 
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4. The empirical analysis 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Tables II and III show that the average PSD increases from 47.32 in 2004 to 102.85 in 2012 
with an average of 79.72 during 2004-2012. Thus, there is significant annual variation in PSD 
scores between 2004 and 2012; however, the index scores show that the extent of P&S 
disclosure varies considerably across countries. Indonesia has the highest PSD index score of 
162 followed by Pakistan at 152.7 and Jordan at 128.9 during (2004-2012). The lowest scores 
are achieved by Syria and the Kuwait, 35.3 and 46.9 respectively during the observed period. 
Table II: Descriptive statistics for PSD score per year 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
2004-
2012 
Average 
PSD 
 score 
47.32 45.85 51.10 62.47 73.97 83.32 97.45 102.32 102.85 79.72 
PSD = P&S disclosure index 
 
Table III: Descriptive statistics for PSD score per country 
 Mean Median Std.dev Min Max Number of IBs 
Bahrain 83.6 74 50.06 0 312 23 
Qatar 70.6 59 39.19 0 134 5 
Kuwait 46.9 34 31.83 0 77 5 
UAE 65.5 59 49.85 0 186 8 
Saudi Arabia 57.2 58 21.55 26 134 6 
Syria 35.3 34 28.6 0 106 2 
Jordan 128.9 142 66.71 0 171 2 
Malaysia 62.8 60.5 36.74 0 177 19 
Indonesia 162 106 137.42 21 438 2 
Brunei 58.5 58.5 36.06 33 84 1 
Pakistan 152.7 92 133.36 0 490 5 
Average PSD score 79.72 65 65.06 0 490 78 
 
Table IV shows that the PSD score ranges from 0 to 490 with an average of 79.72. The average 
FP ranges from −44.35 per cent to 36.02 per cent with an average of 1.4%. The average number 
of blockholders is 2.4 and the mean of institutional ownership is 69.49 %. Only 2.06 per cent 
of company's CEOs serve as a board chairman and the CEO tenure range from 1 to 16 years 
with an average of 4 years. Investment account holders ranges between 3.79 per cent and 91.15 
per cent with average value of 37.6 per cent. Table IV also reports that shariah board size ranges 
from 3 to 7 members with a mean value of 4.44, whereas the average board size is 8.42 members 
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with standard deviation 1.92, in addition the proportion of independent directors in the board is 
63 per cent on average. The average age of IBs included in our sample ranges from 1 to 57 
years with an average age of 14 years. The average Islamic finance share ratio is 16.39 per cent. 
Finally, 40.48 per cent of IBs use AAOIFI standards to elaborate bank annual report and 
financial statements whereas the average country transparency index is 7.49.  
Table IV: Descriptive statistics for independent variables 
 Variables: Mean Median Std.dev Max Min 
PSD 79.72 65.00 65.06 490.00 0.00 
BLOCK 2.40 2.00 1.66 7.00 1.00 
INSTIT 0.69 1.00 0.36 1.00 0.00 
SBSIZE 4.44 4.00 1.14 3.00 7.00 
DUAL 0.02 3.00 3.10 16.00 1.00 
TENURE 4.18 3.00 3.09 16.00 1.00 
BDSIZE 8.42 9.00 1.92 14.00 3.00 
BDIND 0.63 0.57 0.28 1.00 0.11 
IAH 0.38 0.44 0.27 0.92 0.04 
FP 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.36 -0.44 
LEVERAGE 0.57 0.60 0.30 1.00 0.05 
BANKSIZE 21.52 21.69 1.71 25.69 15.10 
BKAGE 14.01 8.00 12.44 57.00 1.00 
IFS 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.54 0.02 
COUTRANSDEX 7.48 8.00 2.15 10.00 4.00 
AAOIFI 0.40 0.00 0.49 1.00 0.00 
LIST 0.53 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 
 
 
4.2. Regression analyses 
Table V shows a number of observations. We find that the number of blockholders has a 
positive effect on (PSD). Our finding is consistent with Tsamenyi et al. (2007); Marston and 
Polei, (2004); Hossain et al., (1994) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002). Thus, we accept H1. This 
indicates that the incentive for IBs to disclose information related to Islamic P&S is stronger 
when blockholders are present.  
 
We also find that institutional ownership has a negative impact on PSD. We therefore reject 
H2. This result could be interpreted by the fact that institutional ownership tends to drive IBs 
to disclose less P&S information. Our result is consistent with Htay et al. (2012). Generally, in 
banking sectors, institutional investors are considered to be one of the most important owners. 
Thus, IBs might prefer to provide P&S information directly to their institutional shareholders 
rather to disclose this information in their annual reports and these shareholders do not care 
about the protection of the minority investors' rights through the improving of the level of P&S 
disclosure. Consequently, IBs having institutions as the controlling shareholders have less 
incentive for P&S disclosure.  
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We also find that IAHs have a positive impact on PSD. Consequently, we accept H3. This 
suggests that IBs as an equity-based capital structure dominated by shareholders equity and 
Profit Sharing Investment Account (PSIA) holders are strongly exposed to massive withdrawal 
risk which threatens the position of the IB. Therefore, increasing disclosures might maintain 
the (IAH). Our finding is in line with Magalhaes and Al-Saad (2013).  
 
In terms of the board characteristics, Table V shows a positive association between board size 
and PSD. Therefore, we accept H4. This is in line with the resource dependency theory (Pfeffer, 
1973 and Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and prior research (i.e. Grassa and Chakroun), suggesting 
that larger boards may form a greater number of committees (e.g., governance and CSR 
committees) which may help to improve banks disclosure. It also shows a positive association 
between the Shariah board size and P&S disclosure. Therefore, we accept H5. Our finding is in 
line with stakeholder-agency theory and prior research (Farag et al., 2014; Farook et al., 2011). 
This suggests that larger Shariah board size may lead to higher levels disclosure as the capacity 
of the monitoring role of the Shariah board increases. Indeed, Shariah board has social influence 
and authority in monitoring the IB’s compliance with Shariah principles, and provides the 
confidence to stakeholders about the legitimacy of the business transactions. Hence, the Shariah 
board in its role as an additional governance body would pressure the management to disclose 
more IB activities in order to assure its investors that it is following Shariah laws and principles.  
 
The table shows that board independence does not affect P&S disclosure. Consequently, we 
reject H6. This suggests that the role of independent directors seems to be ambiguous regarding 
P&S disclosure. This finding is not in line with the resource dependence theory and the 
stakeholder-agency theory. Prior research, however, shows similar results (i.e. Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Ho and Wong, 2001; Bukair and Rahman, 2015). The table also shows that 
duality in position has a positive effect on PSD. We, therefore, accept H7. Our finding is 
consistent with stakeholder-agency theory and and prior research (e.g. Haniffa and Cooke, 2002 
and Grassa and Chakroun, 2016). It also shows that CEO tenure has a positive effect on PSD. 
Thus, we reject H8. This suggests that CEO power in this case is aligned with the interest of 
bank shareholders to be well informed about P&S.  
 
With regard to the control variables, we find that bank age, financial profitability, listing status 
and the business extent of disclosure index has a positive impact of PSD. We find, however, 
that leverage, Islamic finance share and the use of AAOIFI standards have a negative impact 
on the level of PSD. Finally we find that bank size does not affect PSD.  
 
Table V: Determinants of PSD 
  Coef t-student P-value 
BLOCK 8.75 2.09 0.03** 
INSTIT -36.91 -2.10 0.03** 
SBSIZE 15.74 2.37 0.02** 
DUAL 72.93 2.09 0.04** 
TENURE 13.84 7.93 0.00*** 
BDSIZE 4.17 1.63 0.10* 
BDIND -11.04 -0.54 0.59 
IAH 15.43 16.31 0.00*** 
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FP 18.02 2.03 0.04** 
LEVERAGE -33.19 -1.77 0.07* 
BANKSIZE 0.41 0.18 0.856 
BKAGE 2.01 4.64 0.00*** 
IFS -37.26 -5.71 0.00*** 
COUTRANSDEX 16.44 3.65 0.00*** 
AAOIFI -48.35 -2.85 0.01*** 
LIST 39.73 3.09 0.00*** 
R2  0.7818   
F-stat  39.94   
P-value  0***   
*, **,*** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
 
 
4.3 The bi-directional relationship between P&S disclosure and IBs’ financial 
performance 
The question on which dimension(s) of the PSD score derive and impact the PSD-FP link 
remains unanswered.  
 
We estimate Eqs. (2a) and (2b) jointly using three-stage least squares regression to deal with 
any potential endogeneity between (PSD) and (FP). The 3SLS estimation results for the 
simultaneous system are summarized in Table VI. Panel A presents the results of the impact of 
(FP) on (PSD) as in Eq. (2a) whilst Panel B presents the impact of (PSD) on the (FP) as in Eq. 
(2b). The sign of (FP) coefficient in the PSD equation changes and become negative and 
significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the coefficient on (PSD) in the FP equation is positive 
and statistically significant. This result is consistent with the “social impact hypothesis” of 
Cornell and Shapiro (1987) suggesting that satisfying different needs of stakeholders will 
improve the reputation of the company and lead to better financial performance. Our finding 
suggests that the causality between the two endogenous variables runs from (FP) to (PSD) and 
from (PSD) to (FP). The performance equation also shows that there is a positive and significant 
relationship between (SBSIZE), (TENURE), (DUAL), (BLOCK), (INSTIT), (IAH) and the 
control variables and (FP).  
 
To sum up, the 3SLS results strongly suggest that the PSD score of the IBs is determined by 
their corporate governance characteristics and FP and the opposite also is true.  
 
Table VI:  3SLS estimation results for PSD and FP equations 
  
Panel A 
Coef t-student P-value   
Panel B 
Coef t-student P-value 
PSD         0.00 -3.75 0.00*** 
BLOCK 8.95 2.24 0.03**   0.02 2.33 0.02** 
INSTIT -39.99 -2.40 0.02**   -0.06 -1.84 0.07* 
SBSIZE -18.49 -2.84 0.00***   -0.04 -2.49 0.01*** 
DUAL 77.94 2.35 0.02**   0.13 2.01 0.05** 
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TENURE 14.18 8.53 0.00***   0.03 3.52 0.00*** 
BDSIZE 4.01 1.29 0.20   0.01 0.89 0.37 
BDIND -7.38 -0.30 0.76   -0.02 -0.40 0.69 
IAH 3.52 2.19 0.04**   0.01 0.32 0.75 
FP -20.86 -5.73 0.00***     
LEVERAGE -33.79 -1.86 0.06*   -0.05 -1.44 0.15 
BANKSIZE 0.56 0.25 0.80   0.01 0.34 0.73 
BKAGE 2.11 4.80 0.00***   0.01 3.01 0.00*** 
IFS -37.47 -6.06 0.00***   -0.59 -3.06 0.00*** 
COUTRANSDEX 17.02 3.66 0.00***   0.03 2.46 0.01*** 
AAOIFI -51.51 -3.15 0.00***   -0.09 -2.40 0.02** 
LIST 35.58 2.86 0.00***   0.05 2.04 0.04** 
R2   0.8034       0.0930   
Chi. sq   697.33***       14.74   
*, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Our study aimed to examine the impact of corporate governance on PSD for Islamic banks 
around the words. We used a computerised content analysis software to measure levels of PSD. 
Our analysis showed a significant improvement of P&S disclosure over time. We also provided 
evidence that corporate governance mechanisms affects P&S disclosure.  
 
Our finding has important implications. It offers useful insights for preparers and users of 
annual reports as well as for regulators and accounting policy makers. It might help investors, 
who are looking to invest in the studied countries, to have a detailed idea about P&S disclosure 
practices. Moreover, in order to promote this type of disclosure, our finding might encourage 
regulators to improve corporate governance mechanisms in the Islamic banking system through 
the optimization of ownership structure (concentrated ownership and reducing institutional 
ownership), CEO”s characteristics (longer CEO tenure) and the board’s characteristics (larger 
board size). In addition, our finding supports theoretical arguments that banks disclose ethical 
information in order to mitigate information asymmetry and agency costs and to improve 
investor confidence in Islamic reporting. Our finding also enhances the understanding of 
Islamic disclosure environment in emerging markets.  
In measuring PSD, our paper simply counts the number of statements related to P&S, however, 
we did not identify the tone of these statements (good news versus bad news). Future research 
could be carried out to look at the tone of disclosure and the impact of good news and bad news 
information on banks’ performance, its cost of capital and credit ratings. Future research could 
also consider measuring the quality of PSD rather than the quantity of PSD as stakeholders 
would be more interested disclosure quality for decision making. 
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Appendix AI: List of Islamic banks products and services according to Shariah 
Number Keywords Other spelling 
1 Mudarba Mudarabah Mudarb'ah 
2 Ijara Ijarah   
3 Musharaka Misharakah   
4 Murabaha     
5 Istesnaa Istesna'ah Istesna'a 
6 Parallel Istesna'a Istesna'ah muazi   
7 Salam Bai Salam Bai al Salam 
8 parallel Salam Salam Muazi   
9 Sukuk     
10 Ijarah muntehia bittamleek Ijarah-wal-iqtina 
Ijarah thumma al bai' (hire 
purchase) 
11 Diminishing Musharaka Diminishing Musharaka  
12 Bai bitamam al ajal    
13 musawama musawamah  
14 Bai' muajjal    
15 Bai' al 'inah    
16 Hibah    
17 Wadia Wadiah  
18 Wakala Wakalah  
19 Qard hasan Qardul Hasan  
20 restricted investment account    
21 
unrestricted investment 
account 
  
 
22 Profit-sharing- account 
profit sharing investment 
account 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
